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INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Thailand/Korea

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SUBJECT Opinion of Soviet Representatives Concerning Korea

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
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- 1. During July 1950, Igor G. Usachev* ordered a propaganda campaign attacking the Thal Government's offer of troops to assist American forces against the North Koreans. Among the Thai Communist writers participating in the campaign were Boonmee Ratprasarn,** Sanoh Thamasathian, and Udom Pohsri.
- 2. Nikolai Bogaty*** and Usachev frequently exchanged ideas concerning the Korean situation with Chinda Chindanaseri,**** Thai translator for the Soviet Legation, during late July and early August. Usachev stated that the sending of Thai troops to Korea would mean absolutely nothing, because most Thai veterans are foolish and desperate.
- 3. Usachev and Bogaty continually referred to guerrilla warfare, saying that Moscow Radio and other news sources available to them stressed the importance of this type of warfare and its value in achieving final victory. Both Russians expressed complete confidence in a North Korean victory over the combined bouth Korean American forces by the end of August. Bogaty conjectured that the North Koreans might reserve an area in which the American forces would be forced into a final engagement, resulting in the annihilation of the latter. He said that this tactic would prevent exposing the North Korean forces to heavy bombardment and air raids.
- 4. Usachev and Bogaty stated that as late as 28 September 1950 their staffs were confident that North Korea would win the final victory because the USSR and the Chinese Communist Government were supporting the Pyongyang Government. The Soviet representatives expressed confidence in the "people's strength".
- 5. The Communist Peiping Radio allegedly informed the <u>Chuan Min Pao</u> that certain Manchurian troops had been sent to aid the North Koreans. These forces were said to be composed of battle-seasoned troops which had fought with North Korean guerrillas during World War II.

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gives details regarding Boonmee's being authorized by the Soviet Legation in Bangkok to act as news distribution agent for the Legation and the Mahachon.

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states that in early July 1950, Bogaty was telling his Thai contacts that Thailand should remain neutral regarding the Korea situation,

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Comment. In July 1950 Chinda received a letter from Serge S. Nemchina, Soviet Minister to Thailand, wherein the latter expressed his appreciation of Chinda's valuable services.

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